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. Given buoyant capital inflows it has been argued that a substantial appreciation of the Chinese yuan would help to prevent a possible overheating of the Chinese economy and to correct the trade imbalance between China and the US (Goldstein 2003) .
In contrast, proponents of the Chinese dollar peg have argued that the stability of the Chinese yuan against the dollar had a stabilizing impact not only for China itself but for East Asia as a whole (McKinnon 2004) . The reason is that growth tends to be led by exports and China's fast rising international assets are denominated in foreign currency (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004) .
Furthermore, McKinnon and Schnabl (2006) have argued that for countries in the economic catchup process fixed exchange rates provide a more stable framework for the adjustment of labour and asset markets. They argue that Japan's repeated attempts to soften (productivity driven) appreciation pressure by interest rate cuts have led Japan into the liquidity trap.
Up to the present, comparatively few papers have focused on the question of how Chinese monetary policy is likely to behave under a flexible exchange rate regime. Japan provides an important case study for the prospects of the Chinese monetary policy under a freely floating exchange rate for at least four reasons. First, like in China today, growth in Japan has been traditionally led by exports (McKinnon and Ohno 1997) . Second, like Japan China is an important saving surplus country and has accumulated large stocks of dollar denominated international assets (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004) . Third, Japan has shifted from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime in the early 1970s which is recommended for China today. Forth, back in early 1970s up to the late 1980s Japan was in the economic catch-up process like China is today.
In this context we are interested in the question of if and how in Japan "fear of appreciation" affected the Bank of Japans' interest rate decisions. A substantial number of previous studies (Clarida, Galí and Gertler 1998 , Chinn and Dooley 1998 , Hutchison 1988 , Henning 1994 , Funabashi 1988 , McKinnon and Ohno 1997, Esaka 2000, Hillebrand and have acknowledged that despite the official status of a freely floating economy the exchange rate has played an important role for Japanese monetary policy, in particular in times of appreciation. But to our knowledge no paper has formally analyzed the asymmetric impact of the exchange rate on Japanese interest rate decisions in appreciation phases and has explored the respective impact on the liquidity trap.
We want to trace the possibly changing impact of the yen/dollar exchange rate on Japanese monetary policy based on a rolling Taylor type monetary policy reaction function with an exchange rate term. This allows us to provide a dynamic picture of the role of the exchange rate for Japanese monetary policy. To make an assessment of the impact of the yen appreciation on Japan's liquidity trap we introduce an interaction term into the GMM framework.
II. MODEL SPECIFICATION
To investigate the impact of the exchange rate on Japanese monetary policy in a freely floating environment we use the Taylor rule type forward-looking baseline specification by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) 
In equation (1) i t * is the central bank's target nominal interest rate at the time t, which is assumed to depend on the long-term equilibrium interest rate i , expected inflation π t+12 , expected current output y and (possibly) the current exchange rate e t . Equation (1) underlies the assumption that the current output is not known at the time of the interest decision, but the exchange rate is known with a minimum of information costs. We define the central bank targets other than the interest rate in gaps, i.e., as expected deviations from the (desired) bliss points for inflation (π t e t *), output (y t *), and the exchange rate (e t *). E is the expectation operator and Ω t is the central bank's information set at the time t.
If, for instance, within a one year time horizon expected inflation [ ] ( )
is rising above (falling under) the target level π*, the central bank will raise (cut) the interest rate i t *. Similarly, the interest rate will be reduced (increased), if current output is under (above) the desired level y t *.
The exchange rate may influence interest rate decisions for several reasons. Exchange rate changes affect inflation expectations and output, as well as decision making in international policy coordination (as outlined by Funabashi 1988 and Henning 1994) . If the exchange is appreciating below (depreciating above) the level e t * (in price notation), which is regarded as appropriate by the monetary authorities, interest rates will be reduced (increased). In this context the monetary authorities might be more concerned about appreciation than depreciation. 
III. ESTIMATIONS
We estimate equation (3) based on a GMM framework.
Data and Observation Period
We use monthly data from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Japanese short-term interest rates are the uncollateralized money market call rates (mutanpô kôru rêto). Since monthly data are not available for the real GDP, we use seasonally adjusted industrial production as a proxy. The Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to calculate the output gap.
2 Inflation is measured as log differences of consumer price indices versus the previous years' month. The yen/dollar gap is the deviation of the nominal yen/dollar exchange rate from a five-year (60 months) backwards moving average. We justify the moving average as a reference value for the calculation of the exchange rate gap -rather than an arithmetic average -by the fact that since the early 1970s the yen appreciated considerably against the dollar (upper panel of Figure 1 ). Therefore the notion by which an exchange rate was considered as "high" changed over time. If the Chinese yuan would be allowed to float we would expect a similar situation because during the economic catch-up the Balassa-Samuleson effect would lead to a persistent nominal appreciation reflecting relative productivity gains (De Grauwe and Schnabl 2005) .
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects the null hypothesis for the output gap and the exchange rate gap at the 1%-level, and for inflation at the 10%-level. For the short-term interest rate the null cannot be rejected at the 10%-level. Following Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) we interpret this low acceptance as a result of the low power of the test. The observation period is from 1974:01, when the Japanese yen can be assumed to have become fully flexible up to 1999:03 when the Japanese short-term interest rate reached the zero bound and could therefore no longer be used as an instrument for monetary policy making.
Estimation Framework
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) provides a framework to cope with possible endogeneity bias between the interest rate and the independent variables (inflation, output and exchange rate). We use a "two-step" GMM with Newey-West standard errors. The lags of the regressors up to twelve previous periods and a constant are used as instruments.
3
The estimation proceeds in three steps. First, we estimate global (static) coefficients for the entire observation period from 1974:01 to 1999:03 as well as for shorter observation periods as a robustness check. Second, we estimate ten-year rolling windows starting in 1974:01 and iterating forward month by month until 1999:03 in order to create a continuous picture on the role of the exchange rate for Japanese monetary policy in different time periods. Third, we introduce an interaction term which captures a possible asymmetric behaviour of the Bank of Japan monetary policy with respect to yen appreciation or depreciation (section IV). As an additional sensitivity test we perform the three steps also for the Federal Reserve which is widely argued to show "benign neglect" with respect to the exchange rate, in particular for the period after 1985. For instance, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 1 , there is no straightforward relationship between the exchange rate and the federal funds rate. The result for the observation period of Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) from 1979:04 to 1994:12 is similar. The exchange rate term is significant at the 1%-level and the size of the coefficient is even larger suggesting that during this shorter period interest rates were cut (increased) by 1.2 percentage points in reaction to an appreciation (depreciation) by 10 yen per dollar below (above) the target value. For the observation period from April 1979 to March 1999 the impact of the exchange rate on the interest rate is even stronger (1.7 percentage points interest rate cut (increase) in response to an appreciation (depreciation) by 10 yen per dollar below (above) the target value). The coefficients which measure the impact of output and inflation on Japanese interest rate decisions have the expected positive signs and are highly significant for all observation periods. In contrast, as shown in Table 2 for the Federal Reserve there is weak evidence that the exchange rate had a recognizable impact on US interest rate decisions. The result is similar to the Bank of Japan for the whole observation period, as the exchange rate term is negative 6 and turns out significant at the 5% level. Yet, the exchange rate term δ is significantly smaller than for Japan and is insignificant for the other two observation periods. The coefficients which show the impact of output and inflation on the Federal Reserves' monetary policy have the expected signs and are highly significant.
Static Results

We
To this end, the static estimations suggest that -in contrast to the Federal Reserve -the Bank of Japan pursued with one instrument (interest rate) three targets (inflation, output, exchange rate).
This may imply conflicts between the single targets such as between the exchange rate and inflation. For instance when interest rates are reduced (money supply expanded) to counteract appreciation, this may in the longer-term contradict the inflation target. Indeed, in the case the 6 A dollar appreciation (positive sign) implies a lower interest rate.
Japanese bubble economy the substantial interest rate cuts in 1986 and 1987 which intended to stop the "excessive" post-Plaza yen appreciation increased the liquidity supply to the Japanese economy which fuelled the speculation in the Japanese real estate and stock markets (Hoffmann and Schnabl 2007) . 
Dynamic Results
The static estimations don't provide information about a possibly changing impact of the exchange rate on Japanese (or US) monetary policy decision making over the time dimension, in particular in times of appreciation. The impact of the exchange rate on Japanese monetary policy may have been weak during the 1970s, but may have become stronger during the 1980s and 1990s. Interest rates may have declined when the yen appreciated (falling exchange rate in price notation) but may have remained unchanged when the yen depreciated. This is suggested by the upper panel of Figure 1 which shows the development of the yen/dollar exchange rate and the Japanese call money rate.
Periods of strong appreciation such as 1977/78, 1986/87 and the first half of the 1990s are associated with substantial interest rate cuts. In contrast, in periods of yen depreciation such as during the first half of the 1980s and between 1996 and 1998, interest rates remained widely unchanged.
To identify a changing impact of the yen/dollar exchange rate on monetary policy making, we pursue a dynamic approach to the monetary policy reaction function by rolling δ coefficients. If the Bank of Japan had operated under the same (stable) regime throughout the whole observation α β δ δ ρ α β period, we would expect similar coefficients and standard errors. Otherwise, the overlapping subsamples should reveal regime shifts.
When estimating rolling δ coefficients for equation (3) we face a trade off with respect to the window size. The robustness of the results is increasing with the sample size due to the limited finite sample properties of the GMM. To detect potential changes in the monetary policy regime we prefer small sample sizes which can be assumed to be more sensible to possible regime shifts.
Based on various tests we see a window size of 120 observations (10 years) as an adequate compromise. Other window sizes yield by and large the same results.
The respective first sub-sample which is from 1964:01 up to 1974:01 extends to the Bretton Woods system. We are aware of the fact that during the first few years of the rolling estimations Japanese monetary policy decision making is not adequately specified, as a fixed exchange rate regime constitutes a different monetary framework than modelled in equation (3) the significance level is comparatively low and therefore the evidence that the exchange rate had a significant impact on the Japanese monetary policy is weak. Yet, during the appreciation phase in the years 1977 into 1979 there is a sharp increase in the significance level, which is also in line with attempts of international policy coordination to stop the dollar depreciation (Henning 1994) .
7 Indeed the rolling results as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that the coefficients of inflation and output turn out insignificant and negative in the first ten years of the reporting period. Bank of Japan A declining value of the exchange rate coefficient (while still remaining highly significant) during the early 1990s indicates that the Bank of Japan gave less weight to the exchange rate. Nevertheless the impact of the exchange rate on the BOJ interest rate decisions remains significant during the 1990s when the yen continued to appreciate and the ailing (domestic) Japanese economy became even more dependent on exports. A new highly significant spike in the δ-coefficient is observed in 1995, when the Bank of Japan further lowered interest rates to stop the rise of the yen up to its record high of less than 80 yen per dollar during the US-Japanese automobile conflict (McKinnon and Ohno 1997). 8 While both, the size and the significance level of the δ coefficient decline after 1995 when the yen depreciated considerably against the dollar (Figure 1 ) a new spike is observed in 1998 until repeated attempts to prevent the yen from appreciating and stimulating the ailing Japanese economy by interest rate cuts brought Japan into the liquidity trap in March 1999. All in all, the upper panel of Figure 2 suggests that the impact of the yen/dollar exchange rate changed over time with respect to two dimensions. First, the impact seems to be much stronger in the post-Plaza period compared to the pre-Plaza period. Second, it seems that the impact of the exchange rate on interest rate decisions was stronger in appreciation than in depreciation phases. After the increased money supply had contributed to excessive speculation in the Japanese stocks and real estate markets, the Bank of Japan increased the interest rate sharply (again by more than 5 percentage points) in 1989 and 1990 to counteract the inflationary pressure of the bubble (Figure 1 ).
When the yen started to appreciate after the burst of the bubble, interest rates were cut sharply again to counteract the continuing appreciation. The short-term interest rate gradually approached the zero bound.
IV. ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIOUR AND LIQUIDITY TRAP
The estimations as performed in section III suggest that the Bank of Japan responded actively to exchange rate changes. While the static estimations as reported in Table 1 provide evidence that the exchange rate in general has played an important role for Japanese monetary policy making, the rolling estimations show that the Bank of Japan was more sensible to exchange rate changes after the Plaza Agreement. Although the rolling t-statistics of the δ coefficient suggest higher significance levels in appreciation phases they do not provide systematic evidence for an asymmetric reaction of Japanese interest rates in response to yen appreciation. In principle a positive δ coefficient indicates both interest cuts in times of appreciation and interest rate hikes in times of depreciation.
Possible asymmetric monetary policy behaviour with respect to exchange rate changes in appreciation and depreciation phases may provide an explanation why Japan fell into the liquidity trap in early 1999 as suggested by McKinnon and Ohno (1997) . Given that appreciation and depreciation phases are equally distributed over the observation period, interest rates would tend to move ceteris paribus towards zero if interest rates are reduced when the exchange rate appreciates but remain widely unchanged when the exchange rate depreciates. If -as in the case of Japan and in We introduce an asymmetric interaction term as proposed for instance by Zakoian (1994) for GARCH frameworks into equation 3 to isolate the Bank of Japan monetary policy response in appreciation phases. This interaction term I takes the value 1 for appreciation periods (e*>e t ) and the value 0 for depreciation periods (e*<e t ). To identify an asymmetric behaviour in interest rate decisions with respect to appreciation phases the interaction term is multiplied with the exchange rate gap. This yields the following specification: The results for the Bank of Japan are reported in Table 3 for three different observations periods and provide evidence for an asymmetric reaction of Japanese monetary policy to exchange rate changes only in appreciation phases. For the whole observation period from January 1974 to March 1999 the η coefficient is significant at the ten percent level. In appreciation phases the Bank of Japan responded ceteris paribus to an appreciation of 10 yen per dollar below the target value with a 10 percentage points interest rates cut in appreciation phases. The φ and η coefficients are jointly significant at the 10 percent level as indicated by the Wald test. 22.1963*** 0.0000 Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% -level. All in all, the interaction term provides strong evidence that (starting from the late 1970s) the Bank Japan responded asymmetrically to exchange rate swings in appreciation phases. This implies that the Bank of Japans monetary policy contributed to Japans fall into the liquidity trap for two reasons.
First, interest rates were reduced in times of appreciation, but remained widely unchanged in times of depreciation. Second, during the economic catch-up of the Japanese economy which can be assumed to have lasted up to the late 1980s, appreciation phases were more frequent than depreciation phases due to relative productivity gains with respect to the US.
This finding is line with McKinnon and Schnabl (2006) who argue that the flexible exchange rate of the yen against the dollar has contributed to a negative risk premium on the Japanese interest rate which -given the US interest rates and sustained appreciation expectations for the Japanese yenpushed Japan into the liquidity trap. To this end, our exercise provides the following lessons for China. First, even in the absence of (systematic) foreign exchange intervention the exchange rate might strongly influence monetary policy decision making under freely floating exchange rates which increases uncertainly, volatility and the probability of crisis. This effect will be particularly strong if the respective economy is sensible to the competitiveness of exports and if international assets are denominated in foreign currency.
As both seem to be the case for Japan and China, China might react similarly to (productivity driven) appreciation pressure once the exchange is floated. This would also imply a higher probability to fall into the liquidity trap. The economic policy implication is to maintain the fixed exchange rate regime as long as the economic catch-up of China continues and China remains sensible to exchange rate fluctuations, in specific in times of appreciation. While the dollar might be considered as the natural anchor currency for China, alternative anchors may be considered, if inflationary pressure is imported via the exchange rate peg. 
